當英國樂隊“性手槍”的主唱約翰尼·羅頓在《上帝保佑女王》中唱出“在英格蘭的夢想裡沒有未來”的時候，很難說這位留著綠色莫西幹頭、滿口爛牙的朋克搖滾明星是不是有意識地將自己置於英國憲法歷史當中。不管羅頓的原意是什麼，他的評論觸及了一個重要悖論，關乎英國與自身歷史的關係。從1215年的《大憲章》以來，英國的憲法性文件從來沒有授予新的權利。舉例來說，1689年的《權利法案》以“王國真正的、古老的、不容置疑的權利”來證明自身合法性。它提出這些“古老的”權利均可追溯自盎格魯-薩克遜源頭，早在1066年的諾曼征服之前便已存在。其要義在於，英國憲法的每一次“進步”都是倒退，退回諾曼人以武力摧毀英格蘭自由之前的時代，迴歸前封建時代保障自由的憲法。
在中國的學術和政治文化當中也存在類似的悖論，這可能會塑造未來一百年的東西方關係。顏回曾經請教老師孔子應該如何治理國家，孔子教導他要“實行夏朝的歷法，乘坐商朝的交通工具，佩戴周朝的衣冠，取法舜和武王的音樂（行夏之時，乘殷之輅，服周之冕，樂則韶舞。——《論語·衛靈公》）。”孔子對中國現代政治思想的影響力毋庸多言，他這種用過去指引未來的說法看似主觀隨意，但其實是在提倡欣賞不同的國民特性，並警告顏回不要以犧牲民俗為代價拜倒在理性的神壇下。對中國與英國而言，歷史不是某種人們必須逃離的噩夢，而是須要仔細品析的夢想。
這種歷史觀與奠定歐盟基礎的政治哲學形成了鮮明對比。歐盟的成立與法國和俄國革命有相似之處，其根基都來自啟蒙運動產生的理性主義觀念。在歐盟看來，歷史是一場必須儘快擺脫的噩夢，而理性則能將人們喚醒。它認為人類歷史上之所以一再犯錯誤，宗教或民族等非理性觀念要負責任，因此社會需要經歷激進的徹底改造，摒棄傳統價值觀，擁抱“自由”（先拋開它的具體內涵不談）這個所謂最理性的觀念。只要社會遵循理性、追求自由，那麼康德所說的“永久和平”就會誕生。250年後，康德的“世界公民法權”概念幾乎被原株移植，結出的果實便是歐盟。
正如馬克思對國際社會主義運動無比堅定，歐盟的聯邦主義者也堅持認為，他們關於經濟政治自由化的教條終將“破解歷史難題”。歐盟的頂層設計者們將1945年視為元年是有道理的，因為二戰結束後歐洲大陸上的戰事顯著減少。不過，若將這個現象簡單歸因為政治聯盟，則未免流於盲目理想主義，或許經濟繁榮發揮的作用更大。實際上，歐盟的傘狀決策體制不考慮各個群體之間的利益衝突。這導致了匈牙利等國家出現緊張局勢，尤其是意大利近日來的政治亂象可能導致歐盟瓦解。歐盟在移民問題上的立場造成了匈牙利和意大利的危機，它拒絕回應人們的焦慮——只要這種焦慮偏離了歐盟極度理性、科學客觀和普世主義的原則。歐洲各國人民之間的差異遠遠大於歐盟那些當代啟蒙主義者所願意相信的程度。由於歷史的複雜性影響著每一個人，使我們形成不同的慾望和成見，因此衝突本來就具有地域性。愛爾蘭和匈牙利真有那麼多共同點嗎？如果沒有的話，為什麼要將同樣的政策強加於兩國公民呢？歐盟奉行的極度理性主義其實是一種烏托邦，它是不可能達到的。
1962年，英國工黨黨魁曉治·蓋茨克以“1000年曆史”面臨終結的危險為理由，反對加入歐洲經濟共同體（也就是後來的歐盟）。他其實是在暗示，英國從來沒有真正加入過歐洲聯邦主義者所謂的“歐洲命運共同體”——其實就是加洛林王朝和拿破崙一世謀求的歐洲大陸統治權——因此加入一個把“越來越緊密的聯盟”作為目標寫進憲法的聯盟是逆時代潮流的。實際上，在2013年歐盟委員會的一項關於“歐盟公民”自我認可度的調查中，英國排名墊底。雖然對於某些人來說，這是件應當引以為恥的事，但事實上英國與歐洲大陸既沒有“命運共同體”的基礎，也沒有共同的理性主義傳統。
我們不妨從法律的角度來比較英國和歐洲大陸的文化。從這個層面上來說，歐盟仍然是極度理性主義者的試驗項目，歐盟毫不動搖地堅持“四大自由”，即內部資本、人員、商品和服務流動的自由，這種堅持並非源於對每個國家不同需求的相對評估，而是基於抽象的、哲學化的原則。除此之外，法國和美國的憲法性文件都脫胎自啟蒙運動傳統，它們所主張的都是抽象概念，而不是傳統實踐。而在英國這邊，大法官們曾經指出英國法律是完全不合邏輯的，這也正是它聰明之處。普通法的主體部分十分混雜，沒有什麼判例是“高屋建瓴”的，大多也不具有普適性，每個判決都只被限制在特定的範疇之內，先例永遠不等於原則。而這樣的法律構成了英國的憲法。
從這方面來看，英國和中國的政治文化就像失散多年的兄弟。有三種苦惱曾經困擾著法國的雅各賓派和蘇維埃政權，造成了一系列人類最大的悲劇，但2500年前的孔子卻早已看破這一切。首先，孔子不認可僵化的理論創造，認為那些強加嚴苛原則於自身的人比石頭還不會變通。在《論語·子路》中，學生子貢想以人類行為的因果為“士”建立一套簡單的評判公式，孔子訓誡道：“言必信，行必果，硜硜然小人哉！”縱覽馬克思的《政治經濟學批判大綱》我們可以發現，啟蒙運動不外乎是把歷史的複雜性縮減成簡單公式。其次，孔子在《論語·先進》中教導我們，沒有什麼規則是不可變的，所謂“（善人）不踐跡”。這與英國憲法靈活的特徵有異曲同工之妙，托克維爾認為正因為有這樣的憲法，英國才避免了出現法國那樣的大革命。第三，孔子認為世上沒有什麼是不可質疑的，包括自己（吾與回言終日，不違，如愚。——《論語·為政》）。同樣面對普世主義的侵襲，中國和英國的政治文化至少有以上三個共同點。
中英兩國思想史有著驚人的相似之處，它們都拒絕教條化遵循抽象原則，而歐盟則對抽象原則無比痴迷。英國拒絕擁抱歐盟的聯邦主義，因而被詬病為“活在過去”。這種說法倒是恰如其分。英國脫歐公投的不同尋常之處在於，它帶給英國的不是加入某個政治工程的機會，而是退出的機會。結果就是英國憲法的時鐘被撥回了《歐洲共同體法案》剛剛生效的1973年。實際上，英國“脫歐派”的一系列口頭禪，比如“拿回我們的國家”、“主權淪喪”、“收回控制權”等，都指向這個時間點。想回到過去有什麼錯？歷史是我們的個人身份和民族身份的根基，而決定這些身份認同則是我們的成見、偏見和希望，而不是某個毫無同情心、缺乏個性、被喚作“理性”的獨裁者。如果歐盟有一天走向瓦解，那些“理性人”定會對一切橫加指責——包括狹隘的英國、落後的南歐國家，以及落魄的難民——而不會注意到自身意識形態存在缺陷。他們已經成為了“理性”的奴隸。
鑑於中國和英國有著類似的歷史觀，中國應該留意英國如何對待自身的歷史。雖然當下為英國脫歐進行任何辯護都是不明智的行為，而且中國曆來不對外國內政高調錶態，更何況歐盟是個遠比英國更加龐大的市場，但也許未來終有一天，中國作為全球超重量級大國需要擱置短期實用主義，以長遠的策略踐行其價值觀，對試圖破壞多元傳統和文化、試圖建立單一性全球文明的勢力說“不”。
在英國脫歐公投結果出爐後，曾有人問歐洲理事會主席唐納德·圖斯克是否能夠想象一個英國仍然留在歐盟內部的未來。他耍了個職業官僚招牌式的小聰明，以披頭士樂隊主唱約翰·列儂的口吻回答了這個問題：“（歐盟）建立於一個看似不可實現的夢想之上，所以誰知道呢？你可能會說我在做夢，但我不是唯一的一個。”
在理解歐盟的政治哲學根基之後，不難發現圖斯克的評論並不是拙劣的賣弄，更像是在無意間道破了玄機，暴露出他與列儂一致的目標（“想象如果世界沒有國家……也沒有宗教”——披頭士《想象》）。與列儂一樣，圖斯克也希望世界“融為一體”，收斂至唯一的、嚴酷無情的道德體系之下，形成歐盟所謂的“越來越緊密的聯盟”。這種無視歷史的做法將破壞文化的完整性。歐洲當然應該直面並審視自身的歷史，但無論如何也不應該忘記歷史。今天的歐盟雖然看上去溫良中立，但它繼承的卻是過去250年來歐洲大陸各種意圖抹殺歷史的殘酷政權。這個故事最可悲的地方在於，除了就業、自由、主權和民主，英國被歐盟剝奪的清單裡現在還得加上披頭士。
（青年觀察者張成譯，觀察者網楊晗軼校，翻頁閱讀英文原文）
When Johnny Rotten of the Sex Pistols sang “there is no future in England’s dreaming”, it is difficult to say whether this punk rock star, with his green mohican and bad teeth, was consciously casting himself in the grand tradition of British constitutional history. However, regardless of intention, Rotten was commenting on the paradox central to Britain’s relationship with the past. In the UK’s great constitutional documents, stretching back to the Magna Cartain 1215, no new rights were ever conferred. For example, the Bill of Rights justifies itself as the “true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the kingdom”. These “ancient” rights were presented as being Anglo-Saxon in origin, preceding the Norman invasion of 1066. In essence, every constitutional “progression” is a step backwards - towards the pre-feudal, law-abiding constitution that preserved liberty - to a time before the Normans destroyed English freedom by force.
A similar paradox can be identified in Chinese intellectual and political culture - this could shape East-West relations over the next century. When asked by a disciple how to govern a state, Confucius instructed him to “follow the calendar of the Xia dynasty, ride in the carriage of the Shang, wear the ceremonial cap of the Zhou, and as for music, embrace the music of the Shao and Wu”. In this seemingly arbitrary use of the past as a guide to future conduct, Confucius - whose influence on political thought in modern China needs no introduction - was advocating an appreciation for the singularity of national characteristics, and warning against prostrating before the altar of reason at the expense of native customs. Like the UK, China does not see history as a nightmare from which we must escape, but a dream we must carefully analyse.
This is in stark contrast with the political philosophy underpinning the European Union. Like the French and Russian Revolutions, the EU is a project based on the Enlightenment’s idea of rationalism. They claimed that the past was a terror from which we must awake - and reason was here to rouse us. Irrational concepts like religion or the nation were responsible for the same mistakes having been repeated in history. What was needed was a radical overhaul of society in which traditional values were abandoned in favour of that most rational of concepts - liberty (whatever that means). Once reason was followed, and liberty pursued, what Kant called ‘perpetual peace’ would arise. 250 years later, his ius cosmopoliticum would be followed almost to the book, coming to fruition as the European Union.
Like Marx and his International Socialism, EU federalists insist - no less virulently - that their centrist dogma of economic and political liberalisation will ‘solve the riddle of history’. Indeed, top EU figures have referred to 1945 as ‘year zero’. It is true, a remarkably low level of warfare has occurred on the continent since the Second World War. But it is blind idealism to claim that this is because of political union - greater prosperity is probably more responsible. (In any case, the EU was powerless in Bosnia.) The EU’s umbrella-style approach to policymaking gives no account for the clashes of interest between different groups. This has caused tensions in Hungary, and significantly, Italy - which may yet be the EU’s undoing. These two crises are down to its stance on immigration, which has exposed its refusal to engage with any anxieties that deviate from its hyper-rationalistic, scientifically objective, universal principles. We are far more different than the latter-day Enlightenment thinkers of the EU believe. Conflict is endemic; the complexities of history have touched each of us, shaping our desires and prejudices differently. Do Ireland and Hungary really have that much in common? If not, why should the same policies be forced upon its citizens? The EU’s hyper-rationalism is utopian because it is impossible.
In 1962 Hugh Gaitskell explained his opposition to joining what would later be known as the European Union (then just a common market) by warning of the end of ‘1000 years of history’. Speaking as leader of the Labour Party, he was implying that since the UK had never really been a part of what EU federalists ominously call ‘the community of fate’ - that Carolingian, Napoleonic struggle for mastery on the continent - it would be anachronistic to join a union which would later enshrine the objective of ‘ever-closer union’ in its constitution. Indeed, in 2013 the UK came bottom of an EU Commission survey asking to what extent its citizens agreed with the statement “you are a citizen of the EU”. I know people to whom that would be an accusation. The UK shares with Europe neither the ‘community of fate’ upon which the EU was founded - nor the rationalistic tradition.
To explore this idea, let’s compare the two cultures from a legal standpoint. In this regard, the EU is again an experiment in hyper-rationalism: the unyielding ‘four freedoms’ of capital, people, goods, and services are not based on a relativistic assessment of the different needs of each state, but an abstract, philosophical principle. In addition, the great constitutional documents of France and the US, both of which arose from the Enlightenment tradition, declare abstract principles rather than traditional practices. On the other hand, Lord Chancellors (responsible for the effecting running of the British courts) of the past have pointed out that the law in the UK is utterly, brilliantly, illogical. The miscellaneous body of Common Law, which makes up the British Constitution, is composed of rulings of which none are ‘higher’ or universal. Each case decides only what it decides: precedent is not principle.
In this regard, British and Chinese political culture are like long-lost brothers. Confucius stayed well away from three afflictions, which from the Jacobins to the Soviets have been the source of some of the greatest human tragedies. Firstly, he decried ‘theory-making’, thinking men who were enslaved to harsh and self-imposed principles to be no more imaginative than ‘stones’. One of the most memorable incidents of The Analectsis when Confucius reprimands a disciple for trying to determine a formula for the cause and effect of human behaviour. A quick glance at Marx’sGrundrisse can show us how the Enlightenment is nothing if not the reduction of history’s complexities to a simple formula. Secondly, Confucius taught that no rule should be ‘immutable’: ‘a good man is not slavish to a path others have trodden’. This fits with the famously supple nature of the British constitution, which Tocqueville credited for the lack of a French Revolution event in Britain. Thirdly, Confucius claimed that nothing should be ‘beyond doubt’. These three positions remind us of what Chinese and British political culture share in the face of hostile universalism.
The United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China both have a history of ideas that is strikingly similar in their shared aversion to the dogmatic fixation on abstract principles embodied in the European project. For refusing to embrace EU federalism, the UK is smeared for ‘living in the past’. This cannot be denied. Unusually, the referendum gave the opportunity to vote not to join a political project, but leave one. As a result, the constitutional clock was turned back to 1973. Indeed, most of the buzzphrases used by Brexiteers - ‘we want our country back’, ‘loss of sovereignty’, ‘take back control’ - all alluded to this. But what is wrong with the past? It is where our identities - personal, national, or otherwise - are based. And it is our biases, prejudices, and hopes which make up our identity - not some unsympathetic, faceless dictator called Reason. When the breakdown of the EU finally, inevitably comes, you can be sure they will blame anyone, anything - the parochial British, the backward Southern states, even suffering refugees - than notice that their ideology is flawed, and Reason holds them prisoner.
Given China’s similar relationship with history, the PRC should take notice of the UK”s treatment. However, any defence of Britain would currently be inadvisable. Indeed, China is keeping its head down in the best tradition of Deng Xiaoping. Us Brits cannot blame them for this - the EU is a larger market. However, there will come a point when China’s super-heavyweight standing in the world compels it to put short-term pragmatism aside and assert its values in a long-term strategy against those, like the EU, who look to destroy the varied traditions and cultures of the world in favour of a single, global civilisation.
When asked whether he could imagine an outcome in which the UK stays a part of the EU (even after having voted to do the opposite), Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, channelled John Lennon. With that quirky wit for which career bureaucrats are famous, Tusk said that the EU was “built on dreams that seemed impossible to achieve, so who knows? You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one”.
With an understanding of the political philosophy underpinning the EU, Tusk’s comments strike us less as an ill-conceived tease, and more like a Freudian slip revealing how he appears to share the sinister agenda (“imagine there’s [sic] no countries… and no religion too”) of the third most-talented Beatle. Like Lennon, Tusk wants the world to “live as one” - under one unforgiving morality in what the EU calls ‘ever-closer union’. This undermines cultural integrity and ignores history. Europe should confront and scrutinise its history - but under no circumstances forget it. Thus far, the EU has shown itself to be the centrist heir to the brutal regimes of the last 250 years that aimed to do just that. But perhaps the saddest part of this story is that in addition that which which the European Union has already taken from the United Kingdom - jobs, freedom, sovereignty, and democracy - we must now add The Beatles.
閱讀更多 觀察者網 的文章
