近日的白宮新冠病毒疫情資訊會上，特朗普發表了這樣一段講話：
“過去三年，我們建立了完善的移民系統，並把製造業帶回了美國。現在，兩黨必須團結起來，把美國建設成為一個全面獨立的、繁榮的國家：能源獨立、製造業獨立、經濟獨立，國界主權獨立。美國永遠不會成為一個依賴國，將成為一個自豪、獨立、自強的國家。"
許多專家認為，特朗普打算將未來的美國將獨立於全球供應鏈之外，逐步成為一個自給自足的國家。這意味著全球化的終結。
新冠病毒在全球蔓延，這次全球性的災難是否會改變全球化的進程，又將如何改變世界，美國《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）雜誌邀請了來自世界各地的12位思想家談一談他們對疫情後全球秩序的預測，我們挑選了其中六個預測與大家分享：
1
A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free
一個開放、繁榮與自由皆倒退的世界
by Stephen M. Walt
斯蒂芬·沃爾特
（哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院貝爾福科學與國際事務中心教授）
The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. Governments of all types will adopt emergency measures to manage the crisis, and many will be loath to relinquish these new powers when the crisis is over. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. China, South Korea and Singapore have responded best. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”
新冠疫情將強化國家權力、加強民族主義。疫情之下，各種類型的政府都會採取緊急措施以管控危機。而當這場危機結束時，它們中的許多將不情願交出這些新得到的權力。新冠疫情也將加速權力和影響力由西方向東方的轉移。在這場疫情中，中國、韓國和新加坡應對得最為出色，相比之下，歐洲和美國則反應遲緩、應對失策，這進一步損害了西方的“形象”。
What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.
不變的則是世界政治最為根本的衝突本質。以往的疫情（包括1918-1919年大流感在內）並沒有終結大國間的敵對或者開啟全球合作的新時代。本次新冠疫情也同樣不會。由於公民期待本國政府能夠保護他們、國家和公司會尋求降低未來的脆弱性，我們將看到當前如火如荼的全球化進一步消退。
In short, COVID-19 will create a world that is less open, less prosperous, and less free. It did not have to be this way, but the combination of a deadly virus, inadequate planning, and incompetent leadership has placed humanity on a new and worrisome path.
總之，新冠疫情將會創造出一個不再那麼開放、繁榮與自由的世界。事情本可以不必如此，但是致命病毒、計劃不周與無能領導這三者的結合已經使人類走上了一條全新的、但卻令人擔憂的道路。
2
The End of Globalization as We Know It
我們所認知的全球化終結
by Robin Niblett羅賓·尼布萊特（英國皇家國際事務研究所所長）
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization.
新冠疫情可能是壓垮經濟全球化的最後一根稻草。
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.
中國不斷增長的經濟和軍事實力已經激起了美國兩黨與其鬥爭的決心。為實現碳減排目標而施加的社會和政治壓力不斷增加，已經使許多公司對長距離供應鏈的依賴受到質疑。目前，新冠疫情正在迫使政府、企業和社會加強長期應對經濟孤立的能力。
It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.
在這樣的背景下，世界幾乎不可能回到21世紀初那種互利共贏的全球化狀態。一旦各國再無意願保護全球經濟一體化所帶來的共同利益，那麼20世紀建立起的全球經濟治理架構將迅速萎縮。屆時，政治領導人將需要極大的自我剋制來維持國際合作，並防止向公開地緣政治競爭的方向倒退。
Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.
向公民們證明自己可應對疫情危機將使領導人獲得一些政治資本，而那些無力管控疫情的領導人只會極力推卸責任。
3
A More China-Centric Globalization
更加以中國為中心的全球化
by Kishore Mahbubani
馬凱碩（新加坡國立大學亞洲研究所特聘研究員）
The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions. It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.
COVID-19的疫情不會從根本上改變全球經濟方向。它只會加速已經開始的變化：從以美國為中心的全球化轉向更以中國為中心的全球化。
Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement. The Chinese people have also experienced an explosion of cultural confidence. They believe they can compete anywhere.
為什麼這種趨勢會持續下去？因為美國人對全球化和國際貿易失去了信心，不管有沒有美國總統唐納德·特朗普，美國人認為自由貿易協定都是有害的。相比之下，中國並沒有喪失信心。這存在一些深層次的歷史原因。中國領導人很清楚，從1842年到1949年的百年屈辱是自滿和閉關鎖國的惡果。相比之下，中國過去幾十年的經濟復甦是參與全球化的結果。中國人民也經歷了文化自信的大爆發，更加相信自己的競爭力。
Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice.
因此，正如馬凱碩在《中國贏了嗎？》一書中提及美國將面臨兩種選擇。如果美國的首要目標是保持全球領先地位，那麼它將不得不與中國展開一場政治和經濟上的零和地緣政治競賽。然而，如果美國的目標是改善社會狀況不斷惡化下美國人民的福利，那麼美國應該與中國合作。
4
The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors
新冠疫情的歷史將由勝利者書寫
by John Allen約翰·艾倫（前美國海軍陸戰隊上將）
As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways.
一如既往，新冠疫情危機的歷史將由勝利者書寫。每個國家的越來越多的個體正以各種前所未有而令人衝擊的方式感受著這場疫情所帶來的社會緊張。
Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome. To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy, multilateralism, and universal health care. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of decisive, authoritarian rule.To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of authoritarian rule.
不可避免的是，那些憑藉其獨特的政治經濟體制抑或是公共衛生政策觀點而得以保全的國家，將會對其餘那些經歷毀滅性打擊的國家宣告勝利。這將會是民主、多邊主義和全民醫保的偉大勝利。而對另一些國家來說，這將清楚地展現果斷的中央集權統治的好處。
Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.
不管怎樣，這次危機將以一種前所未有的方式將國際權力結構重新洗牌。新冠疫情將持續抑制經濟活動並加劇國家間的緊張態勢。長遠來看，在企業倒閉、勞動力失業的情況下，這次疫情很可能重創全球經濟產出能力。這種混亂的風險對發展中國家和其他貧窮工人比重較大的國家來說影響尤為巨大。國際體系將由此承受巨大的壓力，並導致國家內部和國家間不穩定且廣泛的衝突。
5
More Failed States
更多的失敗國家
by Richard N. Haass理查德·哈斯（美國對外關係委員會會長）
Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.
儘管理查德·哈斯並不喜歡用“持久”一詞作論斷，但他認為新冠病毒危機至少會在幾年內促使大多數國家內顧，更加關注國內事務，而非境外之事。哈斯預計，由於供應鏈的脆弱性，國家將朝著選擇性的自給自足（以及隨之而來的脫鉤）邁出更大的步伐。國家還會表現出對大規模移民更強烈的反對。同時，鑑於資源需要被用於國內重建和應對這場危機的經濟後果，國家對處理地區或全球問題（包括氣候變化）將具有更少的意願或做出更少的承諾。
Many countries will have difficulty recovering, with state weakness and failed states becoming even more prevalent.
許多國家將難以從這場危機中恢復過來，國家貧弱與失敗國家將在世界上更加普遍。
I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.
許多國家將難以從這場危機中恢復過來，國家貧弱與失敗國家將在世界上更加普遍。這場危機很可能會加劇大國之間的持續惡化以及歐洲一體化的衰退。就其積極一面來說，全球公共衛生治理可能會有所加強。但總的來說，根植於全球化的危機將削弱而非增強世界應對危機的意願與能力。
6
The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test
美國未能通過這場領導力測試
by Kori Schake科裡·舍克（美國國際戰略研究所副所長）
The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence. The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested.
由於美國政府的狹隘自私與無能為力，美國將不再被視為國際領導者。這場疫情的全球影響本可以通過國際組織提供更加豐富有效的信息，以便給各國政府更多時間進行準備並調配資源到最需要的地方而被極大削弱。通過國際組織提供更加豐富有效的信息，以便給各國政府更多時間進行準備並調配資源到最需要的地方，這場疫情的全球影響本可以得到極大削弱。這也是美國本應當組織的事情，以此顯示美國雖自私自利但也不盡然如此。
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