美國鐵血網站《國家利益》4月7日發表一篇文章：《糟糕的主意：用海上僱傭兵攻打（封鎖）中國》。這篇網文對美國海軍學院會議論文集一篇正式發表的由兩位美軍退役海軍陸戰隊軍官所寫的學術文章進行了批判。
筆者按圖索驥，在海軍學院網站找到了這篇題為《放出私掠船》的文章（譯文附後），確實被這兩位美軍退役軍官的“奇思妙想”震驚了。概括說來，這兩位退役軍官出的思路很簡單，啟用盛行於17、18世紀的一項古老的海戰法當中的“私掠船”制度，對中國的龐大商船隊進行襲擾，從而達到破壞中國經濟對中國進行封鎖的效果。
原文翻譯如下，愛好學習英文的也可看後附英文原文，有關評論作者另寫一篇：
放出私掠船！放出私掠船！放出私掠船！
美國應簽發“私掠船證書”，以對抗中國在海上的侵略。
美國海軍陸戰隊Mark Cancian上校（已退休）和Brandon Schwartz
海軍戰略家正在努力尋找對付不斷上升的中國海軍的方法。最簡單，最舒適的方法是要求增加艦艇和飛機的數量，但國防預算可能已達到頂峰，這可能不是可行的策略。經官方蓋章授權的”私掠船”可以提供一種低成本工具，以增強和平時期的威懾力，並在戰時獲得優勢。它將攻擊中國的不對稱脆弱性，中國的商船隊比美國大得多。確實，對中國全球貿易的攻擊將損害中國的整個經濟，並威脅到該政權的穩定。最後，儘管普遍存在相反的神話，但美國或國際法並未禁止美國”私掠船”。
什麼是“私掠船證書”？
“私掠船”不是海盜，它確有規則和授權，由政府向平民頒發，允許他們俘獲或摧毀敵方船隻。《美國憲法》明確授予國會發布它們的權力（第一條，第8條，第11條）。所捕獲的船隻和貨物被稱為捕獲品，捕獲法在美國法典中有所規定。在美國，獎金索賠由美國地方法院裁定，傳統上將收益支付給私掠船員。（“私掠船”可以指私人商船的船員或船舶本身，也可以稱為“私掠船證書”）
國會可能會制定政策（例如，指定私掠船的目標，程序和資格），然後授權總統監督”私掠船”制度。國會還可以使私掠船免於承擔某些責任，並通過債券和最新行為法規來擔保制止濫用和違反國際法的可能性。
可以在衝突開始後的幾周內迅速發出私掠船證書，讓私人船實施追捕。相比之下，為海軍建造一個新的戰鬥員將花費四年。在獨立戰爭和1812年戰爭期間，私掠船遠遠超過海軍艦艇，一名美國官員稱私掠船是“我們最便宜和最好的海軍”。4儘管許多人喪生，但數千人航行並破壞了英國的貿易。英國官員抱怨說，他們不能保證民用貿易的安全。
“私掠船”是一種曾經被普遍接受，但現在已經完全超越常規的利用私營部門參與戰爭的方式。
崛起的中國海軍
中國軍隊的崛起已經有充分的文獻記載，但有幾點強調了為什麼”私掠船”將成為美國海軍戰略的有用要素。
中國在其周圍建立了強大的防禦網絡，有時被稱為反進入/拒絕區域（A2 / AD）。作為該戰略的要素之一，中國已將海軍從1980年代的一支適度的沿海部隊擴展到至少200艘艦艇的遠洋部隊，並配備了先進的防空系統，反艦導彈甚至航空母艦。支持海軍的是陸基導彈和轟炸機。
打破這種防禦要求海軍遂行的戰役比美國海軍過去70年來的要求更為苛刻，如果追捕中國的全球商船隊，那就幾乎沒有能力執行其他任務。太平洋戰役中可能會需要留下任何有限的海軍力量，以留意俄羅斯，伊朗或朝鮮等其他潛在對手。
非對稱漏洞
中國通過“一帶一路”倡議積極擴大了其在全球經濟和外交領域的影響力，但這種擴張造成了脆弱性，因為必須保護這些投資。中國的脆弱性更加嚴重。在中國航運出口的推動下，過去15年來，中國的經濟翻了一番。中國的國內生產總值（GDP）的38％來自貿易，而美國的GDP只有9％。中國的社會穩定是建立在權衡的基礎上的：中國共產黨告訴人民，他們將沒有民主制度，但他們將獲得經濟繁榮。
中國的商船隊龐大，因為在中國建造和運營商船的成本很低，而且其出口驅動型經濟創造了巨大的需求。 2018年，中國在全球商船隊中擁有2112艘船，而香港又有2185艘船，此外，中國擁有龐大的遠洋捕魚船隊，估計有2500艘船。
相比之下，美國的商船隊中只有246艘船。該船隊-建造和運營費用昂貴-主要由《瓊斯法》維持，該法規定在美國港口之間運送貨物的船舶必須在美國旗下。
這種不對稱的脆弱性使美國獲得了主要的戰略優勢。”私掠船”對中國經濟以及共產黨造成的威脅可以為美國提供主要的戰時優勢，增強和平時期的威懾力，從而減少戰爭的可能性。即使中國威脅要派遣自己的私掠船，美國的脆弱性也相對較小。
狗在戰鬥中的大小
通常的做法是讓美國海軍軍艦從海上驅逐中國商船。不過，美國海軍將全力以赴應對中國人民解放軍海軍（PLAN）。美國船隊數量已降至295艘左右，儘管在2040年代初可能達到並超過340艘，然後再次下降，但355艘船的目標可能無法實現。與中國的衝突可能需要整個船隊；確實，相比於一個有能力的捍衛自己家鄉的中國海軍，即使是355艘船也可能太少了。
相比之下，在第二次世界大戰中，美國海軍增加到6700艘，既不算英國龐大的艦隊也不算其他盟友的貢獻。而且，盟軍，尤其是英國和法國，擁有全球性的殖民網絡，拒絕了敵人的庇護，並提供了打擊敵艦的基地。在以後的衝突中將無法獲得可比資產。確實，一些前盟友和殖民地甚至可能為中國船隻提供庇護所。
為攫取中國黃金巡邏大洋
利用中國的脆弱性需要大量船隻，而私營部門可以提供這些船隻。海洋遼闊，有成千上萬個港口要掩藏或衝刺。儘管海軍無法承受數十億美元的驅逐艦在里約熱內盧郊外等待中國船隻離開數週的等待，但由於美國外交官對（可能是中立的）巴西施壓，一艘私掠船可以耐心地在附近等待。
無論是招募船員還是武裝船隻都不會構成主要障礙。私掠船員無需全副武裝，因為他們將輕裝（或不武裝）商船，選擇易受攻擊的目標，或與其他私掠船員合作行動。由於目標是捕獲船體和貨物，因此船東不想沉沒船隻，只是說服船員投降。有多少商人會傾向於戰鬥而不是投降並在舒適的拘留中度過戰爭？
現有的私營軍事行業無疑會抓住機會成為私掠船企業。當前有數十家公司提供安全服務，從相當於購物中心的警衛人員到艦船上的武裝反海盜特遣隊。大量潛在的新兵已經表明願意為私人承包商工作。例如，在伊拉克戰爭的高峰期，美國僱用了20,000名武裝承包商從事安全工作。
實際上，已經建立了私人保安船，證明了該概念的可行性。私營安保公司黑水公司裝備了一支武裝巡邏艇，以捍衛索馬里海盜的商業運輸。在索馬里海盜高峰時期，印度洋地區約有2700名武裝承包商和40艘私人武裝巡邏艇在印度洋航行。
正如獎金的前景誘使成千上萬的海員在1812年革命和戰爭期間簽約私掠船一樣，類似的誘因（例如從一次捕獲中賺取數百萬美元的前景）將在將來吸引所需的人員。
需要新方法
“私掠船”的概念使海軍戰略家感到不舒服，因為它是一種戰爭中的作戰樣式，與1815年以來美國海軍的作戰方式不符。沒有現代的使用經驗，對法律基礎和國際輿論也存在合理的擔憂。但是，戰略家不能主張採用開箱即用的思維來面對日益嚴峻的中國挑戰，然後再轉向傳統解決方案，因為開箱即用的思維會使他們感到不舒服。
由於戰略形勢是新的，我們的思維也必須是新的。在戰時，私有企業可能會淹沒海洋並摧毀中國經濟及其政權穩定所依賴的海洋產業。僅僅進行這種運動的威脅就可以增強威懾力，從而完全阻止戰爭的發生。與其他地方一樣，在戰略上，所有舊事物都將再次成為新事物。
Unleash the Privateers!
The United States should issue letters of marque to fight Chinese aggression at sea.
By Colonel Mark Cancian, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) and Brandon Schwartz
April 2020
Proceedings Vol. 146/2/1,406
FEATURED ARTICLE
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For a discussion of the law regarding letters of marque, see: U.S. Privateering Is Legal
Naval strategists are struggling to find ways to counter a rising Chinese Navy. The easiest and most comfortable course is to ask for more ships and aircraft, but with a defense budget that may have reached its peak, that may not be a viable strategy. Privateering, authorized by letters of marque, could offer a low-cost tool to enhance deterrence in peacetime and gain advantage in wartime. It would attack an asymmetric vulnerability of China, which has a much larger merchant fleet than the United States. Indeed, an attack on Chinese global trade would undermine China’s entire economy and threaten the regime’s stability. Finally, despite pervasive myths to the contrary, U.S. privateering is not prohibited by U.S. or international law.
What are Letters of Marque?
Privateering is not piracy—there are rules and commissions, called letters of marque, that governments issue to civilians, allowing them to capture or destroy enemy ships.1 The U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to issue them (Article I, section 8, clause 11). Captured vessels and goods are called prizes, and prize law is set out in the U.S. Code. In the United States, prize claims are adjudicated by U.S. district courts, with proceeds traditionally paid to the privateers.2 (“Privateer” can refer to the crew of a privateering ship or to the ship itself, which also can be referred to as a letter of marque).
Congress would likely set policy—for example, specifying privateer targets, procedures, and qualifications—then authorize the President to oversee the privateering regime.3 Congress also could indemnify privateers from certain liabilities and curb the potential for abuse and violations of international law through surety bonds and updated regulations on conduct.
Letters of marque could be issued quickly, with privateers on the hunt within weeks of the start of a conflict. By contrast, it would take four years to build a single new combatant for the Navy. During the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, privateers vastly outnumbered Navy ships, with one U.S. official calling privateers “our cheapest and best navy.”4 Though many were lost, thousands sailed and disrupted British trade.5 British officials complained they could not guarantee the safety of civilian trade.
Privateering constitutes a once universally accepted but now thoroughly unconventional way of harnessing the private sector in war.
A Rising Chinese Navy
The rise of the Chinese military has been well documented, but a few points highlight why privateering would be a useful element of U.S. naval strategy.
China has built a powerful defensive network around its homeland, sometimes called an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope. As one element of this strategy, China has expanded its navy from a modest coastal force in the 1980s to an oceangoing force of at least 200 ships, with sophisticated air defenses, antiship missiles, and even aircraft carriers. Backing up the navy are land-based missiles and bombers.
Cracking open such a defense would require a naval campaign more demanding than anything the U.S. Navy has done in the past 70 years, leaving little capability for other tasks, such as hunting down China’s global merchant fleet. Whatever limited naval forces might be left over from a campaign in the Pacific would be needed to keep an eye on other potential adversaries, such as Russia, Iran, or North Korea.
Asymmetric Vulnerabilities
A print showing the U.S. privateer General Armstrong under attack by HMS Plantagenet, a 74-gun British ship of the line, in 1814. Though it has been two centuries since the U.S. government issued letters of marque, the prospect of a fight in the western Pacific makes this a good time to reconsider their use.
Library of Congress
China has aggressively expanded its global economic and diplomatic influence through its Belt and Road Initiative, but this expansion creates a vulnerability, as these investments must be protected. Chinese vulnerability goes deeper. China’s economy has doubled in the past 15 years, driven by exports carried in Chinese hulls. Thirty-eight percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) comes from trade, against only 9 percent of U.S. GDP.6 Chinese social stability is built on a trade-off: The Chinese Communist Party has told the people they will not have democratic institutions, but they will receive economic prosperity.
China’s merchant fleet is large, because the cost to China of building and operating merchant ships is low, and its export-driven economy creates a huge demand. In 2018, China had 2,112 ships in its global merchant fleet and Hong Kong had another 2,185.7 In addition, China has a massive long-distance fishing fleet, estimated at 2,500 vessels.8
By contrast, the United States has only 246 ships in its merchant fleet. That fleet—expensive to build and operate—is sustained mainly by the Jones Act, which mandates that ships conveying cargo between U.S. ports must be U.S.-flagged.
This asymmetric vulnerability gives the United States a major strategic advantage. The threat privateering poses to the Chinese economy—and hence the Communist Party—could provide the United States with a major wartime advantage and enhance peacetime deterrence, thus making war less likely. Even if China threatens to dispatch its own privateers, U.S. vulnerability is comparatively small.
Size of the Dog in the Fight
The ordinary course of action would be to have U.S. Navy warships drive China’s merchant fleet from the seas. However, the U.S. Navy would have its hands full taking on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The U.S. fleet is down to about 295 ships, and though it may reach and surpass 340 in the early 2040s before declining again, the goal of 355 ships is probably out of reach.9 A conflict with China would likely require this entire fleet; indeed, against a capable PLAN adversary defending its home waters, even 355 ships might be too few.
By contrast, in World War II, the U.S. Navy grew to 6,700 ships, counting neither Great Britain’s huge fleet nor contributions from other allies.10 And the allies, Britain and France particularly, had a global network of colonies that denied adversaries sanctuary and provided bases for operations against enemy ships. Comparable assets will not be available in a future conflict. Indeed, some former allies and colonies might even give sanctuary to Chinese vessels.11
Cruise the Seas for Chinese Gold
Capitalizing on Chinese vulnerabilities requires large numbers of ships, and the private sector could provide them. The ocean is large, and there are thousands of ports to hide in or dash between. While the Navy could not afford to have a multibillion-dollar destroyer sitting outside Rio de Janeiro for weeks waiting for Chinese vessels to leave, a privateer could patiently wait nearby as U.S. diplomats put pressure on (presumably neutral) Brazil.
Neither recruiting crews nor the need to arm ships would constitute a major obstacle. Privateers do not need to be heavily armed, because they would be taking on lightly (or un-) armed merchant vessels, choosing vulnerable targets, or acting cooperatively with other privateers. Since the goal is to capture the hulls and cargo, privateers do not want to sink the vessel, just convince the crew to surrender. How many merchant crews would be inclined to fight rather than surrender and spend the war in comfortable internment?12
The existing private military industry would doubtless jump at the chance to privateer. Dozens of companies currently provide security services, from the equivalent of mall guards to armed antipiracy contingents on ships. A large pool of potential recruits has shown willingness to work for private contractors. At the height of the Iraq War, for example, the United States employed 20,000 armed contractors in security jobs.
In fact, private security vessels already have been created, demonstrating the concept’s viability. The private security firm Blackwater outfitted an armed patrol craft to defend commercial shipping from Somali pirates.13 At the height of Somali piracy, there were some 2,700 armed contractors on ships and 40 private armed patrol boats operating in the Indian Ocean region.14
Just as the prospect of prize money induced thousands of seamen to sign on with privateers during the Revolution and the War of 1812, similar inducements—such as the prospect of earning millions of dollars from a single capture—would attract the needed personnel in a future conflict.
New Approaches Required
The notion of privateering makes naval strategists uncomfortable because it is an approach to war that does not conform to the way the U.S. Navy has fought since 1815. There is no modern experience of their use, and there are legitimate concerns about legal foundations and international opinion. But strategists cannot argue for out-of-the-box thinking to face the rising challenge of China and then revert to conventional solutions because out-of-the-box thinking makes them uncomfortable.
As the strategic situation is new, so must our thinking be new. In wartime, privateers could swarm the oceans and destroy the maritime industry on which China’s economy—and the stability of its regime—depend. The mere threat of such a campaign might strengthen deterrence and thereby prevent a war from happening at all. In strategy, as elsewhere, everything old shall be new again.
1. Department of Defense (DoD), Law of War Manual (2016), § 13.5.2; Louise Doswald-Beck, ed., San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1995), Rules 13(i), 40–41, 59–60, 135, 138–39.
2. 10 USC § 8852. For prize law, see 10 USC §§ 8851–81, and 10 USC § 7668 (allowing courts to only pay net proceeds into the Treasury).
3. U.S. Congress, An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, and Prizes, chapter 102, 26 June 1812.
4. Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 96
5. Edgar Stanton Maclay, A History of American Privateers (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, and Co., 1900), 506; George F. Emmons, The Navy of the United States: from the Commencement, 1775, to 1853 (Washington, DC: 1853), 170–203.
6. World Bank Trade Database, data.worldbank.org.
7. “Merchant Marine” in CIA Factbook 2018 (Washington, DC: 2018).
8. Gary Doyle, “Chinese Trawlers Travel Farthest and Fish the Most: Study,” Reuters, 22 February 2018.
9. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan (19 October 2018).
10. Naval History and Heritage Command, “U.S. Ship Force Levels 1886–Present,” www.history.navy.mil.
11. MAJ Nicholas R. Nappi, USMC, “But Will They Fight China?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144, no. 5 (May 2018).
12. DoD, Law of War Manual, note 1 at §13.5.3.
13. Kim Sangupta, “Blackwater Gunboats Will Protect Ships,” The Independent, 19 November 2008.
14. Sean McFate, The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 142.
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