譯者 王為
文中黑字部分為原文，藍字部分為譯文，紅字部分為譯者註釋或補充說明
As Abe Steps Down, Did Abenomics Succeed?
By Erik Norland
In early September Prime Minister Shinzō Abe announced that he would be leaving office after nearly eight years, having significantly altered Japan’s economic policies. When Abe took the reins in December 2012, the economy was beset by three intertwined problems:
9月初日本首相安倍晉三宣佈辭職下臺，其在將近八年的執政期內對日本的經濟政策做出了重大改變。安倍在2012年再次上臺之時，日本經濟正受困於三個錯綜複雜的問題：
Large annual budget deficits of around 6-8% of GDP since the mid-1990s
自1990年代中期以來日本每年的預算赤字約相當於GDP的6-8%
Persistent deflation, which made reducing debt ratios nearly impossible
通縮痼疾導致降低國債佔GDP的比率成為幾乎不可能的任務
Weak economic growth since Japan’s equity and real estate bubbles popped in the early 1990s
自從日本的股市和房地產市場泡沫在1990年代初破裂以來，日本的經濟提振乏力
Abe sought to address these problems with his “three arrows” initiative of easy monetary policy, tight fiscal policy, and structural reform. Over the past eight years Abe’s policies have had some success. For starters, nominal GDP had its first sustained period of growth since the mid-1990s (Figure 1), lasting until late 2019 when a second increase in the value added tax (VAT) and the pandemic intervened.
安倍試圖通過 “三矢”之策來解決這些難題，即寬鬆的貨幣政策、緊縮財政政策以及結構化改革。在過去八年間，安倍的施策取得了一些成果。首先，日本GDP的名義增速自1990年代中期以來首度出現持續增長，增長勢頭一直持續到了2019年，其後受第二次增加消費稅以及新冠疫情的影響而中斷，見圖1。
Figure 1: Nominal GDP growth is essential to bringing debt under control.
GDP的名義增速對於有效控制政府債務負擔意義重大
Tightening Fiscal Policy
緊縮財政政策
Prior to Abe taking office at the end of 2012, Japan ran enormous budget deficits since the mid-1990s. Japan’s public debt rose from 62% of GDP in 1992 to 201% by the beginning of 2013. Japan’s government spending as a percentage of GDP was not particularly high by the standards of most developed countries but its tax revenues were extremely low. Abe addressed the low level of tax revenues through two increases in the value added tax: the first, from 5% to 8% and the second, from 8% to 10%. This and other revenue measures, along with improved economic growth, reduced Japan’s pre-Abe budget deficit from the 6-8% of GDP to just 2.8% by 2019 (Figure 2).
自1990年代中期一直到2012年末安倍開始二次執政之前，日本的預算赤字居高不下，日本公共債務佔GDP的比率從1992年的62%升至2013年年初的201%。按照大多數發達國家的標準來衡量，日本政府開支佔GPD的比重並沒有高高哪裡去，但日本稅收收入的絕對額異乎尋常的低。安倍通過兩次增加消費稅的方法來解決日本稅收收入極低的問題，第一次是將消費稅的稅率從5% 提升至8%，第二次是將消費稅率從8%提升至10%。增稅以及其他增收舉措的實施，外加經濟形勢的改善，令日本年度預算赤字佔GDP的比率從安倍重新執政之前的每年6-8%降至2019年的只有2.8%，見圖2。
Figure 2: Stronger economic growth and a higher value added tax shrank the deficit
經濟強勁增長以及消費稅率的提升降低了日本預算赤字佔GDP的比率
Japan’s debt ratios continued to rise during Abe’s first three years in power, with public debt hitting 219% of GDP by the second quarter of 2016. By the end of the first quarter of 2020, the most recent period for which we have data, Japan’s public debt was 218% of GDP, slightly below its peak but, importantly, no longer growing. Meanwhile, Japan’s household and corporate debt levels have been stable under Abe at around 60% and 105% of GDP, respectively (Figure 3).
在安倍二次執政的前三年，日本公共債務佔GDP的比率還在繼續升高，到了2016年二季度該比率升至219%。根據最新的統計數據， 2020年一季度末，日本公共債務佔GDP的比率為略低於峰值的218%，但重點是該指標沒有繼續上行。以此同時，日本家庭以及企業債務佔GDP的比率分別為60%和105%左右，見圖3。
Figure 3: After three years of Abenomics, debt ratios stabilized
安倍經濟學實施三年後，日本債務佔GDP的比率穩定了下來
As a result of the pandemic, Japan’s budget deficit and debt ratios are rising once again in 2020. So far, Japan has allocated the equivalent of 7% of GDP to boost the economy amid the pandemic and has extended loans to corporations and households valued at more than 10% of GDP. As such, Japan’s budget deficit for the fiscal year ending in March 2021 will probably fall in the 12-22% of GDP range, and possibly more. This, however, hardly makes Japan unique as similar deficits will occur in the United States and in much of Western Europe (Figure 4).
受新冠疫情影響，日本的預算赤字以及債務佔GDP的比率在2020年再次出現上行。截至目前為止，為提振疫情期間的日本經濟，日本已配置的資金總量達到了GDP的7% ，為企業和家庭提供的信貸資金總量超過GDP的10%。因此，在截止到2021年3月末的本財政年度裡，日本預算赤字佔GDP的比率應為12-22%，甚至更多。但日本並非發達國家中的孤例，美國和西歐大多數國家的赤字狀況也是如此，見圖4。
Figure 4: Japan’s fiscal measures are large but by no means exceptional
日本財政政策的力度空前但並沒有顯得很另類
Easier Monetary Policy
寬鬆的貨幣政策
Abenomics’s ultimate objective was to improve the Japanese economy. Tighter fiscal policy, while necessary for controlling budget deficits, is antithetical to that goal. Essentially, tighter fiscal policy could potentially have derailed growth had it not been for much easier monetary policy.
安倍經濟學的終極目標是提振日本經濟。緊縮的財政政策，雖然對控制預算赤字的增長是必要的，但卻是與終極目標背道而馳的。實際上，如果沒有非常寬鬆的貨幣政策保駕護航的話，財政政策的緊縮會葬送經濟成長的局面。
When Abe took office in 2012, the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) monetary policy was unexceptional. Like the Federal Reserve (Fed), it had rates at zero and had dabbled in quantitative easing (QE). The main difference with the Fed was one of timing: the BoJ’s rate had hit zero a decade before that of the Fed, and it had conducted some QE between 2000 and 2006 and again between 2010 and 2012 when the Fed was just getting started on its own asset purchases. But at 30% of GDP, the BoJ’s balance sheet wasn’t particularly large. It was about the same as the ECB’s and about 1.5x that of the Fed relative to the size of their respective economies.
當安倍在2012年再次上臺後，日本銀行的貨幣政策與其他央行並無不同之處。像美聯儲一樣，日本銀行也將利率水平降至零並開始試水量化寬鬆。日本銀行與美聯儲的一大區別在於是施策的時點：在美聯儲搞零利率之前，日本銀行已經搞了十年，日本銀行還在2000年至2006年期間搞了一些量化寬鬆舉措，並在2010-2012年期間當美聯儲剛剛開始買入資產的時候再次推出量化寬鬆舉措。但當時日本銀行在量化寬鬆項下買入的資產相當於日本GDP總量的30%，與其他央行相比並沒有大很多，幾乎與歐洲央行的水平持平，約等於美聯儲的1.5倍。
In order to offset the fiscal consolidation, the BoJ opted for a QE of unprecedented size and depth that dwarfed similar measures in Europe and North America. The BoJ took its balance sheet from 30% of GDP to over 100% of GDP prior to the pandemic. Now its surpassing 125% of GDP (Figure 5).
為了對沖財政緊縮帶來的負面影響，日本銀行將量化寬鬆的力度和範圍推升到前所未有的程度，足以令歐洲央行和美聯儲自慚形穢。至新冠危機襲來之前，日本銀行資產負債的規模佔GDP的比重已經從之前的30%升到100%以上，而最新的比率已經超過了125%，見圖5。
Figure 5: B0J undertook an unprecedented QE to offset tighter fiscal policy and end deflation.
日本銀行採取了力度空前的量化寬鬆舉措旨在對沖財政緊縮帶來的影響並結束通縮局面
Moreover, the BoJ didn’t simply buy government debt. In a preview of what the Fed and the ECB would do during the pandemic, the BoJ was also buying corporate debt as early as 2014. It even purchased equities via exchange traded funds (ETFs), something the BoJ’s counterparts haven’t done and deny are planning to do so.
此外，日本銀行並沒有只是簡單地買入國債而已。在關於美聯儲以及歐洲央行在疫情期間應如何應對的分析中已經提到，日本銀行早在2014年就已經買入日本的公司債了，甚至還通過申購交易所交易基金的方式買購票，而這些舉措是其他央行尚未採取或拒之千里的。
In addition to the QE measures, the BoJ also conducted yield curve targeting, essentially setting caps on the yields of various maturities of government bonds. Finally, like the ECB but unlike the Fed, it also experimented with negative interest rates, setting its deposit rate at -10 basis points (bps) as of January 29, 2016.
在量化寬鬆之外，日本銀行還對日本國債收益率曲線的形態進行了直接干預，旨在對各期限國債收益率的水平設置最高限制。最後，日本銀行還採取了負利率政策，在這一點上效仿了歐洲央行而非美聯儲，在2016年1月29日將存款利率的水平設定為-10個基本點。
So, have these measures worked? On balance it’s difficult to say. Looking at Japan’s nominal GDP, it looks like a success. Nominal GDP expanded from early 2013 until mid-2019 which is essential for controlling debt ratios since nominal GDP is the denominator in the calculation of those ratios. Real GDP, meaning after inflation, tells a more nuanced story. Judging from the graph of real GDP (Figure 6), it’s difficult to point to any acceleration in Japan’s after-inflation pace of economic growth.
那麼這些舉措奏效了嗎？總的來看很難得出這個結論。從名義GDP的總量的角度來看，是有效果。從2013年初至2019年中，日本名義GDP的總量一直處於正增長，這一點對於控制公共債務佔GDP的比率非常重要，因為名義GDP的總量是計算該債務比率的分母。而扣除了通脹因素的實際GDP的總量卻揭露出另一個事實，從實際GDP總量的角度來看，很難得出扣除通脹因素後日本的實際GDP出現了加速增速的結論，見圖6。
Figure 6: QE did not bring about any obvious acceleration in Japan’s real rate of growth
量化寬鬆並未令日本的實際經濟增速明顯加快
While QE did not give any obvious boost to Japan’s real rate of growth, it did halt persistent deflation with the help of a depreciation in the trade weighted value of the Japanese yen between early 2013 and early 2016. Paradoxically, the BoJ’s resorting to negative rates did not cause the yen to fall further. Rather, in the four-and-a-half years since the BoJ instituted negative deposit rates, the yen has appreciated somewhat (Figure 7). In the year after the decision to go to negative rates, the yen began to rise and inflation regressed into deflation before eventually going positive again (Figure 8).
雖然量化寬鬆並未令日本的實際經濟增速出現明顯的加快，但受助於日元貿易加權匯率在2013年初至2016年初這一期間出現貶值，日本的通縮痼疾在此期間沒有繼續蔓延。出人意料地是，日本銀行所採取的負利率政策並沒有導致日元匯率進一步貶值，日元匯率反而在日本銀行開啟負利率政策之後的4年半時間裡有所升值，見圖7。在負利率的貨幣政策實施一年後，日元匯率開始上升，通脹率轉為負增長直到最終再次轉為正增長，見圖8。
Figure 7: Negative rates did not lead to a weaker yen
負利率並未令日元匯率走弱
Figure 8: Abenomics helped inflation turn positive but it hasn’t stayed consistently above zero
安倍經濟學令日本的通脹增速轉為正增長，正增長的狀況並未持續
By at least one measure, Abenomics has been a success: Japan’s jobs market improved markedly until the pandemic struck, with the best jobs-to-applicant ratio seen in decades (Figure 9).
但安倍經濟學至少在一個方面取得了成效：在新冠疫情襲來之前，日本的就業狀況大幅改善，求人倍率創下數十年來的最高值，見圖9：
Figure 9: Even during the pandemic, Japan’s jobs-to-applicant ratio is still better than it was pre-Abe
即使在新冠疫情期間，日本的求人倍率仍高於安倍二次執政之前
Currency Traders Implied View of the JPYUSD exchange rate
外匯交易員對日元和美元匯率是怎麼看的？
With BoJ rates at -10bps and Fed funds in a range from zero to +25bps, one might expect the difference in market rates between Japan and the US would be in the order of 10-35bps, or perhaps about 22.5bps on average. The difference between Japanese and US 3M LIBOR is at the high end of that range and has been in the 30-35bps range. However, the difference in interest rates from the spot JPYUSD and JPYUSD currency futures using CME’s FX Swap Rate Monitor suggests a greater rate differential of around 40-50bps exists in the currency market (Figure 10).
日本銀行的政策性利率為-10個基本點，美聯儲的聯邦基金利率的波動區間為0-25個基點，有人可能會認為美元和日元市場利率之間的利差因為10-35個基本點，或者平均一下為22.5基本點左右，美元和日元3個月LIBOR之間利差應處於該利差區間的上軌，波動範圍為30-35個基本點。但是，芝加哥商品交易所的外匯互換行情顯示，通過日元/美元即期匯率以及日元/美元外匯期貨合約的報價所折算出來的美元和日元的利差約為40-50個基本點，見圖10。
Figure 10: FX swap rates suggest a bigger US-Japan rate differential than LIBOR or central bank rates
外匯互換的報價顯示美元和日元市場利率之間的利差要高於美元和日元LIBOR之間以及美日央行政策性利率之間的利差
Bottom Line
要點
Pre-pandemic Abenomics shrank Japan’s annual budget deficits and stabilized debt ratios.
在新冠疫情襲來之前，安倍經濟學令日本年度預算赤字佔GDP的比率出現下行並令政府債務佔GDP的比率穩定下來
Post-pandemic, Japan will run extremely large budget deficits in the short term.
新冠疫情過後，日本預算赤字將在短期內升至非常高的水平
Abenomics had some success at turning inflation positive and boosting the jobs market.
在促使通脹增速轉正以及提振就業方面，安倍經濟學取得了一些成效
An unprecedented central bank balance sheet expansion facilitated Abenomics’ successes.
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央行資產負債總量前所未有的大擴張是安倍經濟學成功的一個因素
The interest rate differential in the currency market may be greater than what LIBOR and the gap between BoJ and Fed policy rates implies.
在外匯市場上美元和日元市場利率之間的利差要高於美元和日元LIBOR利率之間以及日本銀行與美聯儲政策性利率之間的利差
