導讀
當今，新冠疫情成為了世界經濟發展的決定性要素：隔離措施已導致巨大的經濟增速下行，而長遠的經濟恢復也面臨巨大壓力。
中央銀行盡最大的努力在對抗疫情帶來的經濟壓力。作為最後貸款人，中央銀行致力於穩定金融市場並同財政當局緊密協調以平緩經濟的不確定性並擠出潛在的金融泡沫。通過精準貨幣政策並適時擴展其政策工具箱的應用，各中央銀行協力為全球經濟提供充足的流動性，從而從“大蕭條”中拯救更多的企業與就業崗位。
儘管世界經濟的復甦正緩慢進行，仍然有許多的政策努力亟待付諸行動。許多醫療調節受限的國家仍然處於抗爭新冠危機的前期，因而下一步的任務是著眼與解決主權債務的償付能力問題從而為經濟回暖做充分準備。
在發力解決當下危機的同時央行無法忽視其他的優先事項，即為安全高效的支付清算體系提供強有力的制度基礎，特別是在日新月異的技術變革領域。
需要注意的是，中央銀行面臨著史無前例的考驗，供給需求端同時受到衝擊，產業鏈供應鏈被迫中端，服務貿易遭到嚴重打擊，潛在的不確定性引發資本市場的投資擠出以及非銀行金融部門因負債端前所未有的脆弱性。央行正面臨脆弱的金融環境與受約束的政策空間雙重考驗，而敏捷，勇敢與決心則是央行被賦予的崇高責任與使命。
危機管控早已成為中央銀行核心要義的構成部份，而央行清楚地意識到，快速而強勁的流動性提供是最有效的危機回應。然而，疫情疊加油價下跌的大宗商品市場波動衝擊，使得央行不得不強化流動性措施——進一步釋放銀行流動性並加大政府債券與其他可購買資產與債券的購買力度。對於新興經濟體的中央銀行而言，在錨定通貨膨脹預期的條件下需要切實降低利率，而美聯儲則通過央行互換協議以及回購便利工具投放流動性。與08年國際金融危機相比，後疫情的金融修復因為銀行強大的資本充足率與更低的風險暴露而更加強勁。與財政部門緊密的政策協調同樣帶來了市場的穩定預期。
未來的風險仍在繼續。企業與個人的償付危機並未消除，當財政直接支持耗盡與支付到賬逾期，銀行將面臨巨大的破產風險；新興經濟體正面臨三重經濟停滯——國內經濟活動，國際資本流動以及經常項目的商品輸出與匯款。中央銀行則面臨著潛在的四大考驗：首先，私營部門領域的融資面臨著擴大與萎縮的矛盾，進一步擴大融資範圍將引燃諸多政治經濟風險，央行的透明度與合法性在擴張的風險中面臨質疑。其次，中央銀行對政府債務的融資挑戰了其原本的政策使命，過於寬鬆的利率環境帶來物價水平的波動，無限量化寬鬆與其他非常規貨幣政策似乎為赤字貨幣化提供合法性，這將從根本上削弱央行的獨立性與可信度。再次，低利率的寬鬆環境約束央行的政策空間，央行缺乏合理的方式應對新一輪通脹預期與價格波動。最後，央行權衡金融市場與實體經濟的相互關係面臨困惑，如何通過穩定金融市場以支持實體經濟的恢復至關重要。
市場不確定性催生了央行數字貨幣，構成了支付手段與方式的革命與演化。通過數字貨幣的深化與發展，是否可以為解決當前的經濟困局提供出路？
最後，經濟問題的解決需要中央銀行系統的全球協調與合作，在短期的流動性借貸便利的提供到長期的跨境支付障礙的消除，甚至強調綠色金融的作用應對氣候變化與能源危機。國際清算銀行將進一步承擔全球央行的協調中樞，在全球經濟事務中保持敏銳的思考與及時的政策回應。
作者 | Agustín Carstens，國際清算銀行行長
英文原文如下：
In the face of an unexpected adversary: the crucial role for central banks
Speech by Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements on the occasion of the Bank’s Annual General Meeting in Basel on 30 June 2020
Ladies and gentlemen
It is my pleasure to present to you this year’s BIS Annual Economic Report, our 90th. I will give you a broad overview of its key messages and then hand the floor over to Claudio Borio, Head of our Monetary and Economic Department, who will speak in more detail on the prudential response to the pandemic. Finally, Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research, will dive deeper into explaining the centrality of central banks in the evolution of payment systems.
The shock of the Covid-19 pandemic has turned out to be a defining moment: the containment measures are inflicting an enormous economic blow, and the long-term effects will be profound.
Central banks have done their utmost. As lenders of last resort, they have reacted promptly, stabilising financial markets and working in concert with fiscal authorities to cushion the blow. By providing monetary accommodation, in some cases further expanding their toolkit, central banks have supplied dearly needed oxygen to the global economy, preserving more firms and saving more jobs that would otherwise have been lost during the lockdown.
While the global economy seems to be recovering, much remains to be done. The virus is far from defeated, and many countries, especially those with weaker defences, are still in the early phase of the struggle. The next tasks will be to address solvency, prepare for the recovery, and adjust the economy to the post-pandemic world.
As central banks grapple with these immediate dangers, they cannot ignore other priorities. For example, central banks continue to be essential in providing the foundations for safe and efficient payments, particularly in this era of rapid technological change.
An unexpected adversary
2020 will be a year for the history books. Early in January and February, near-term prospects seemed bright – until the Covid-19 pandemic struck. Around the world, output drops have been the largest since the Great Depression.
It is this global sudden stop that makes the crisis unique: the worldwide lockdowns have crippled both supply and demand, crushing the production of goods and services. Tourism, retail and travel have been particularly hard hit. Meanwhile, supply disruptions and the prevailing uncertainty have sapped investment. Moreover, central banks have faced this sudden stop in the context of some underlying vulnerabilities and limited policy space.
Pre-pandemic, during the prolonged period of easy financial conditions, vulnerabilities were growing, particularly in the non-bank financial sector. I noted last year that these vulnerabilities could easily throw the global economy off track should a shock occur. Unfortunately, an unexpectedly brutal one did just that.
Tackling a crisis of this magnitude would have been a tall order under any circumstances. Nimbleness, boldness and decisiveness were called for. And central banks delivered. However, it has been quite challenging, given the limited monetary policy space available.
Bold and prompt responses
Crisis management is part of a central bank’s job description. In some respects at least, the current episode has replayed a familiar>
But, this time, aggravated by the oil price collapse, the crisis unexpectedly morphed into a scramble for cash. When markets threatened to freeze up, central banks quickly went beyond their traditional liquidity support for banks and provided large-scale direct support to markets, buying government debt and other securities on an unprecedented scale. These “all hands on deck” measures stemmed the liquidity and confidence crises.
Spillovers were again large. Emerging market economies (EMEs) saw a sudden stop in capital flows that was far more severe than during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). Yet, with inflation expectations better anchored, EME central banks had scope to cut interest rates. Moreover, and for the first time, several intervened as market-makers of last resort in their domestic sovereign debt markets. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve expanded the size of its swap lines, made them available to more countries, and offered a new repo facility as a source of liquidity.
The lender of last resort role needed to be adjusted in real time. Central banks bought private sector securities and expanded their purchase programmes to include low-rated paper. Working with fiscal authorities, central banks also funded businesses directly, expanding their balance sheets faster than in the GFC.
Yet even this Covid-19 crisis had a silver lining. Thanks to the post-GFC reforms, banks entered it in much better shape: more strongly capitalised and less exposed to funding strains. Thus, they were better placed to channel funds to the corporate sector, especially to smaller firms. In addition, financial authorities eased some regulatory requirements, making it easier for banks to lend.
For their part, fiscal authorities acted promptly and on a massive scale, often providing the bulk of the response to support households and businesses. Acting within their mandates, central banks supported these actions by lowering interest rates, facilitating public debt financing, providing monetary stimulus, establishing funding programmes through banks, and keeping markets liquid.
The purpose of all these actions has been clear: to support economic activity, especially to help firms avoid insolvency and resume operations with limited damage, and so limit job destruction.
Central banks have been successful, but risks remain
In many of their aims, central banks have succeeded. Financial markets have stabilised, equity markets have quickly recovered, and spreads have narrowed again. The corporate sector has resorted to new issuance on a generous scale. Even so, many challenges lie ahead.
Financial markets may have become too complacent – given that we are still at an early stage of the crisis and its fallout. The outlook for the world economy is still highly uncertain. At best, we have only just overcome the liquidity phase of the crisis in the countries that are now relaxing restrictions. In many others, the health crisis is still acute. And the epidemic could flare up again anywhere.
Importantly, the shock to solvency is still to be fully felt. In this stage, the heavy lifting is expected to come from fiscal authorities. Business insolvencies and personal hardship may well increase. When this happens, possibly triggered by cliff effects as initial fiscal support runs out and payment moratoriums expire, banks will find themselves in the eye of the storm.
Risks are especially high for emerging market and developing economies, which have already experienced a triple sudden stop: in domestic economic activity, in capital flows and, for several, in commodity exports and remittances. In many cases, weaker health systems and large informal sectors make matters worse. Their policy trade-offs are starker than those of most advanced economies, given tight external constraints and much more limited fiscal and monetary space. Above all, sovereign debt could be affected. Indeed, rating agencies have already started on a round of downgrades.
Many challenges ahead
As central banks respond to the crisis, they face many questions and trade-offs. Let me mention four.
First, when allocating funding, central banks have been forced to navigate within what is, in normal times, private sector territory. Venturing into new areas brings economic and political risks to the fore. For example, there may need to be painful but necessary downsizing in significant sectors. What is the most appropriate process for differentiating between viable and non-viable firms?
More generally, when central banks justifiably overstep boundaries that have traditionally defined their central roles, transparency may need to be enhanced and other safeguards put in place to ensure that their legitimacy is not eroded.
Second, with the crisis, interactions between monetary and fiscal policies have become even more prominent. Today, monetary and fiscal policies support each other. Central banks can lower interest rates, stabilise financial markets with liquidity support, and engage in quantitative easing and other unconventional monetary policy measures. For their part, fiscal authorities can provide stimulus.
In the process, central banks have smoothed the path for government finances. However, within the central bank mandate, this should only be a temporary expedient. Moreover, it should only be attempted by central banks with a credible record of accomplishment in adhering to their inflation mandates. Let us remember that these types of policy are only possible because of the credibility that monetary policymakers have built up over the years.
These actions, while necessary, may eventually threaten central bank independence and credibility. In particular, given the massive fiscal response and the significant increase in public debt that inevitably will follow, many voices will call for financing costs to be kept artificially low and to allow the inflation tax to shave the real value of sovereign debt, possibly supported by forms of financial repression. At the point when crisis management gives way to ensuring price stability, it will be critical that central banks remain independent to fulfil their mandates, and act in consequence.
Third, as soon as circumstances allow, central banks need to regain monetary policy space. Eventually inflation will come back. As the pricing power of firms and labour increases, supply-cost pressures will emerge, pushing up prices and possibly triggering second-round effects. Staying ahead of the curve will be essential, also because easy financial conditions will lead to greater vulnerabilities.
Finally, central banks need to continue to underpin financial stability. As regulators and supervisors, central banks must balance the use of buffers and the need to support the economy, with financial stability. Central banks also have to revisit the size and design of their financial systems. For the second time in little over a decade, they have remedied the effects of vulnerabilities in non-bank parts of the financial system. They strengthened the banks post-GFC; now they need to help ensure that the non-bank financial sector optimally supports the real economy over the medium term.
Evolving payment systems require a solid foundation
Market dysfunction has been limited, despite the severity of this crisis. This shows that central banks perform essential anchoring roles for the monetary and financial system. This includes underpinning the resilience of financial market infrastructure and payment systems.
However, payment systems do present some longer-term challenges. Digital innovation is radically reshaping payment services. Technological advances have led to new payment methods and consumer interfaces. More recently, large non-bank providers have entered payment services. Some of these trends, such as contactless and online payments, have accelerated during the pandemic. These and many other innovations have reduced costs, improved convenience, and broadened access to payments.
However, technology can only do so much. As the issuers of money – which is, after all, the economy’s unit of account – central banks have a key role to play in the provision of public goods. A key feature of payment systems is their two-tier structure: the private sector spearheads innovation, drawing on its ingenuity and creativity to serve customers better; and the central bank provides the solid foundation, primarily by enabling the finality of payments that settle on its balance sheet. As history indicates, and recent developments underline, the central bank’s role is critical here as it underpins the public good aspects of the payment system for the economy at large.
Central banks have also embraced innovation in their roles as operators, catalysts and supervisors. In their role as operators, they provide public infrastructure, including access to central bank settlement accounts. They foster interoperability, by promoting standards and easy-to-use interfaces. This in turn helps to ensure a level playing field and so promote competition and innovation. In their role as supervisors, they boost efficiency by aligning private sector incentives and steering market structure towards the public good.
In addition, central banks have shown that they can themselves operate at the cutting edge of innovation, not least when directly providing services to the general public. This brings to mind central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). CBDCs could offer a new, safe, trusted and widely accessible means of payment. They could also spur continued innovation in payments, finance and commerce. If CBDCs are to fulfil their potential and promise as a new means of payment, their design and implications deserve close study and consideration. The BIS will continue supporting central banks in their CBDC research and design efforts, through the new BIS Innovation Hub, its committees, and broader analytical work.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
Central banks have shown again their mettle when faced with a crisis, expanding their toolkit, reacting swiftly and forcefully to stabilise the financial system, and supporting credit flows to firms and households. In some cases, they have even adopted a wide array of prudential policy measures to buffer the impact of the shock. However, central banks are also fully aware of the challenges ahead. Some of these challenges extend beyond their mandate. Monetary policy alone cannot deliver higher sustainable economic growth in the context of price and financial stability. Growth-friendly fiscal policies and structural reforms continue to be urgently needed.
Fiscal policy could better support growth as well as financial stability. At the same time, it will be essential to keep public finances on a sustainable long-term track. Structural reforms are vital as well. As damaging as it is, this crisis could be an opportunity to implement growth-boosting economic policies. Given that their resources are limited, governments should prioritise investment in sustainable growth – for instance, by fostering energy transitions to address climate change risks.
Global cooperation will continue to be of the essence, particularly in the rapid provision of large-scale liquidity facilities. International cooperation is also required to address longer-term problems such as the cost of cross-border payments, and to address the increased risks in the global financial system. Certainly, this will keep us busy in the years to come and the BIS will stay as relevant as ever.
Let me now hand over to Claudio Borio and Hyun Song Shin, who will elaborate on some of these issues and the special chapter of our Annual Economic Report.
編譯 謝智愚
編輯 李錦璇
來源 BIS
審校 金天、蔣旭
監製 董熙君、安然、魏唯
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關於我們
中國人民大學國際貨幣研究所（IMI）成立於2009年12月20日，是專注於貨幣金融理論、政策與戰略研究的非營利性學術研究機構和新型專業智庫。研究所聘請了來自國內外科研院所、政府部門或金融機構的90餘位著名專家學者擔任顧問委員、學術委員和國際委員，80餘位中青年專家擔任研究員。
研究所長期聚焦國際金融、貨幣銀行、宏觀經濟、金融監管、金融科技、地方金融等領域，定期舉辦國際貨幣論壇、貨幣金融（青年）圓桌會議、大金融思想沙龍、麥金農大講壇、陶湘國際金融講堂、IMF經濟展望報告發佈會、金融科技公開課等高層次系列論壇或講座，形成了《人民幣國際化報告》《天府金融指數報告》《金融機構國際化報告》《宏觀經濟月度分析報告》等一大批具有重要理論和政策影響力的學術成果。
2018年，研究所榮獲中國人民大學優秀院屬研究機構獎，在182家參評機構中排名第一；在《智庫大數據報告（2018）》中獲評A等級，在參評的1065箇中國智庫中排名前5%。2019年，入選智庫頭條號指數（前50名），成為第一象限28家智庫之一。
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