How the mighty have fallen
強大的高盛是如何墮落的
Goldman Sachs’s desire for a new identity captures the changes in global banking
高盛對新身份的渴望折射了全球銀行業的變化
In its prime Goldman Sachs was exceptional. Fifteen years ago, just before the global financial crisis, the bank easily outshone its Wall Street rivals—winning the most lucrative deals and making the most profitable trades. It printed money, both for shareholders and employees. Although the crisis imperilled the firm along with the rest of the banking industry, it navigated the chaos relatively well. Success allowed it to be haughty—while other banks engaged in the grubby game of sucking up to investors, Goldman remained secretive and enigmatic.
在鼎盛時期，高盛(Goldman Sachs)表現出色。15年前，就在全球金融危機之前，高盛輕而易舉地讓華爾街競爭對手相形見絀，贏得了最有利可圖的交易，進行了最有利可圖的交易。它為股東和員工印製了鈔票。儘管危機危及該公司和銀行業的其他公司，但它相對較好地駕馭了混亂。成功讓它變得傲慢：當其他銀行正在進行討好投資者的骯髒遊戲時，高盛仍然神秘而神秘。
How times have changed. This week the firm held its first investor day, led by David Solomon, who took over as chief executive last year. It comes after a long period of underperformance. A dollar invested in Goldman in 2010 would be worth just $1.60 today. A dollar wagered on the s&p500 would be worth $3.60, and on JPMorgan Chase, $4.10. Goldman has become a laggard.
時代已經變得多麼的不同了。本週，該公司舉行了第一個投資者日，由去年接任首席執行官的大衛·所羅門(David Solomon)領導。這是在長期表現不佳之後出現的。2010年投資高盛的1美元今天只值1.6美元。押注於標準普爾500指數的1美元價值3.6美元，押注於摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)的1美元價值4.10美元。高盛已經成為落後者。
Its predicament reflects two big changes in Western banking. One is the declining profitability of capital-markets activity, in large part the result of tighter rules, including higher capital requirements for riskier activity, penalties on lenders that rely on debt markets to fund themselves and tighter compliance regimes. The second is the rising importance of technology in the industry, as consumers and corporate borrowers shift to digital banking. This appears to give an immediate advantage to very large lenders that can support huge it budgets, and to big tech platform firms that have vast numbers of customers who can be sold financial products, as is already the case in much of Asia.
高盛的困境反映了西方銀行業的兩大變化。其一是資本市場活動的盈利能力下降，這在很大程度上是更嚴格規則的結果，包括對高風險活動的更高資本金要求，對依賴債務市場為自己融資的貸款人的懲罰，以及更嚴格的合規制度。第二是隨著消費者和企業借款人轉向數字銀行，技術在該行業的重要性不斷上升。這似乎給能夠支持鉅額IT預算的超大型貸款機構和擁有大量客戶的大型科技平臺公司帶來了立竿見影的優勢，這些客戶可以出售金融產品，就像亞洲大部分地區已經出現的情況一樣。
Goldman has been on the wrong side of these trends. Consider its performance relative to JPMorgan Chase, a giant full-service firm. Goldman is still wrestling with past compliance mistakes— it is expected to pay billions of dollars in penalties for the 1mdb scandal in Malaysia. Its funding costs are higher than JPMorgan Chase’s (1.95% compared with 1.25% in 2018). Its ratio of expenses to revenues is worse. Not surprisingly, its return on tangible equity, a measure of profitability, was just 11% in 2019, compared with 19% for its rival. For
Goldman’s shareholders the only consolation is that it has done better than Europe’s flailing banks—in the most recently reported quarter Barclays managed 10%, Credit Suisse 9%, and Deutsche Bank made a loss.
高盛在這些趨勢中一直站在錯誤的一邊。考慮一下其相對於摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)的表現，摩根大通是一家提供全方位服務的巨型公司。高盛仍在糾結於過去的合規失誤--預計將為馬來西亞1MDB醜聞支付數十億美元罰金。其融資成本高於摩根大通(1.95%，2018年為1.25%)。它的支出與收入的比率更差。不足為奇的是，其有形股本回報率(衡量盈利能力的指標)在2019年僅為11%，而其競爭對手為19%。對於高盛的股東來說，唯一的安慰是它比歐洲舉步維艱的銀行做得更好-在最近報告的季度裡，巴克萊管理了10%，瑞士信貸管理了9%，而德意志銀行則出現了虧損。
Mr Solomon’s new plan is, in part, to become more like JPMorgan Chase, with a broader range of services and funding. Goldman wants to expand Marcus, its fast-growing consumer arm, and also to build out its transaction-banking division that ships money around the world for companies. It plans to attract more deposits, which are typically the cheapest way to fund a bank. It has hired an army of tech experts. All this, Goldman hopes, will raise its return on tangible equity to 14%.
Solomon的新計劃，在一定程度上是要變得更像摩根大通，提供更廣泛的服務和資金。高盛希望擴大其快速增長的消費者部門Marcus，並建立其交易銀行部門，為公司在世界各地運送資金。它計劃吸引更多的存款，這通常是為銀行提供資金的最便宜的方式。它僱傭了一支技術專家大軍。高盛希望，所有這些都能將其有形股本回報率提高到14%。
Goldman says it recognises the need for fundamental reform. It boasts of transforming its macho culture with a more diverse intake of recruits. But you can question how much it has really changed. It continues to allocate half its capital to its oncefamed trading operation, despite its drab returns. And it still spends a lavish $12bn a year on rewarding its staff, even as the firm earned only $8bn for its shareholders in 2019. So far investors remain sceptical, with its shares priced at their book value.
高盛表示，它認識到了進行根本性改革的必要性。它引以為豪的是，通過更多樣化的招募，改變了自己的男子漢文化。但你可以質疑它到底改變了多少。儘管回報平淡無奇，但它繼續將一半的資本分配給其一度破產的交易業務。而且，儘管該公司2019年只為股東賺取了80億美元，但它每年仍在獎勵員工上花費120億美元。到目前為止，投資者仍持懷疑態度，其股票定價為賬面價值。
If Goldman’s reinvention fails it may ultimately have to do a deal. Uniting Wells Fargo and Goldman, for example, would create something more like JPMorgan Chase (and with a similarsized balance-sheet). In America regulators and some politicians are sceptical about bigger banks. In Europe, where the industry is more desperate, the mood has already changed, with matchmaking now encouraged. At least Goldman’s mergers and- acquisitions advisers will be in on any action.
如果高盛的重塑失敗，它最終可能不得不做一筆交易。例如，富國銀行和高盛的合併將創造出更像摩根大通的公司(資產負債表規模相似)。在美國，監管者和一些政客對大銀行持懷疑態度。在這個行業更加絕望的歐洲，人們的情緒已經改變，現在鼓勵婚介。至少高盛的併購顧問將參與任何行動。
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