《经济学人》在本周最新的文章中指出，不能简单的将次贷危机的经验套用在本次危机之中，每一次金融冲击都是不同的。
1930年，中央银行放任银行倒闭。2007年，即使次贷危机即将爆发，几乎没人知道什么叫次贷。2020年病毒恐慌带来的金融冲击目前还不能与这两次相提并论，但是其造成的金融风险必须要尽快处理。
但是，一项基于上市公司的初步“压力测试”表明，10% -15%的公司可能面临流动性问题。
疫情对实体经济的影响肯定会传导至金融市场，仔细阅读本期《经济学人》的最新短文：《How to deal with a new sort of financial shock，The subprime crisis is not a good guide to markets today》，对我们了解这次因疫情起的危机会有帮助。
WHEN FACED with a bewildering shock it is natural to turn to your own experience. As covid-19 rages, investors and officials are scrambling to make sense of the violent moves in financial markets over the past two weeks. For many the obvious reference is the crisis of 2007-09. There are indeed some similarities. Stock markets have plunged. The oil price has tumbled below $40 a barrel. There has been a flurry of emergency interest-rate cuts by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. Traders are on a war footing-with a rising number working from their kitchen tables. Still, the comparison with the last big crisis is misplaced. It also obscures two real financial dangers that the pandemic has inflamed.
当人们面对巨大冲击时,希望借鉴以往的经验是很自然的。随着covid-19的爆发，投资者和官员们都在努力厘清过去两周金融市场的剧烈波动。对许多人来说,最明显的参照事件是2007-2009年的危机，它们之间确实有一些相似之处：股票市场暴跌；油价跌至每桶40美元以下；美联储和其他央行已采取一系列紧急降息措施；交易员们进入战备状态（即便越来越多的人在餐桌上工作）。然而，不应将这次冲击与上一次大危机相提并论，这将掩盖此次全球病毒大流行所引发的两个真正的金融风险。
The severity of the shock so far does not compare with 2007-09. Stockmarkets have fallen by a fifth from their peak, compared with a 59% drop in the mortgage crisis. The amount of toxic debt is limited and easy to identify. Some 15% of non-financial corporate bonds were issued by oil firms or others hit hard by the virus, such as airlines and hotels. The banking system, stuffed with capital, has yet to seize up; interbank lending rates are under control. When investors panic about the end of civilisation they rush into the dollar, the reserve currency. That has not yet happened.
迄今为止,此次危机的严重程度无法与2007至2009年的危机相比。此次股票市场从最高点下跌了五分之一，而次贷危机时下跌了59%。有毒债务的规模有限，而且容易识别。仅有大约15%的非金融公司债券是由石油公司或其他受病毒重创的公司（如航空公司和酒店）发行的。银行体系资本充足且并没有停转；银行间拆借利率可控。当投资者感觉天要塌下来时，一般会涌向美元储备货币，这种情况还没有发生。
The nature of the shock is different, too. The 2007-09 crisis came from within the financial system, whereas the virus is primarily a health emergency. Markets are usually spooked when there is uncertainty about the outlook six or 12 months out, even when things seem calm at the time- -think of asset prices dropping in early 2008, long before most subprime mortgage borrowers defaulted. Today, the time horizon is inverted: it is unclear what will happen in the next few weeks, but fairly certain that within six months the threat will have abated.
这次冲击的性质也不同。2007—2009年的危机来自金融系统内部，而此次病毒爆发则主要是突发卫生事件。通常，即使当前的情况看起来很平静，若未来6到12个月的前景存在不确定性，市场也会恐慌。例如，2008年初，大多数次级抵押贷款借款人还远未违约，资产价格就已经在下跌了。现在的时间线则正相反：虽不清楚未来几周会发生什么，但大家确信6个月内威胁将会减弱。
Instead of tottering Wall Street banks or defaults on Florida condos, two other risks loom. The first is a temporary cash crunch at a very broad range of companies around the world as quarantines force them to shut offices and factories. A crude ”stress test” based on listed companies suggests that 10-15% of firms might face liquidity problems. Corporate-bond markets, which demand precise contractual terms and regular payments, are not good at bridging this kind of short but precarious gap.
此次虽没有华尔街银行苦苦挣扎和佛罗里达公寓违约，但另外两个风险正在迫近。首先，随着全球范围内隔离措施的实施，很多关闭办公室和工厂的公司都出现了暂时的现金短缺。一项基于上市公司的初步“压力测试”表明，10% -15%的公司可能面临流动性问题。公司债券市场有精确的合同条款和定期支付要求，难以应对这种短暂但不稳定的缺口。
In 2007-09 the authorities funnelled cash to the financial system by injecting capital into banks, guaranteeing their liabilities and stimulating bond markets. This time the challenge is to get cash to companies. This is easy in China, where most banks are state-controlled and do as they are told. Credit there grew by 11% in February compared with the previous year. In the West, where banks are privately run, it will take enlightened managers, rule tweaks and jawboning from regulators to encourage lenders to show clients forbearance. Governments need to be creative about using tax breaks and other giveaways to get cash to hamstrung firms. While America dithered, Britain set a good example in this week's budget.
2007至2009年，当局通过向银行注资、为银行债务提供担保和刺激债券市场，向金融体系提供大量资金。这一次的挑战是为企业提供资金。这在中国很简单，因为大多数银行都会按照国家要求去做，与去年同期相比，中国2月份的信贷增长了11%。在西方，银行是私人经营的，需要开明的管理者、规则调整和监管机构的规劝，才能鼓励银行向客户提供宽松环境。政府需要创造性地利用税收减免和其他优惠，为陷入困境的公司提供资金。当美国在这方面举棋不定之时，英国本周通过的预算开了个好头。
The second area to watch is the euro zone. It is barely growing, if at all. Central-bank interest rates are already below zero. Its banks are healthier than they were in 2008 but still weak compared with their American cousins. Judged by the cost of insuring against default, there are already jitters in Italy, the one big economy where banks' funding costs have jumped. On March 12th the European Central Bank promised additional liquidity for the banking system, notably to support lending to small and medium-sized firms (but did not cut interest rates). The danger is that it, national governments and regulators fail to work together.
另一个值得关注的是欧元区。该区域经济几乎没有增长，央行的利率已经低于零。欧元区的银行虽然比2008年时更健康，但与美国同业相比仍然较弱。从违约保险的成本来判断，意大利作为该区域的大型经济体已经出现了紧张情绪，银行融资成本大幅上升。3月12日，虽然没有降低利率，欧洲央行承诺向银行系统提供更多的流动性，特别是支持向中小型企业提供贷款。危险在于，各国政府和监管机构未能通力合作。
Every financial shock is different. In 1930 central banks let banks fail. In 2007 few people had heard of the subprime mortgages that were about to blow up. This financial shock does not yet belong in that company. But the virus scare of 2020 does create financial risks that need to be treated- -fast.
每一次金融冲击都是不同的。1930年，中央银行放任银行倒闭。2007年，即使次贷危机即将爆发，几乎没人知道什么叫次贷。2020年病毒恐慌带来的金融冲击目前还不能与这两次相提并论，但是其造成的金融风险必须要尽快处理。
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